This article describes the evolution of political conditions for accession to the European Community from 1957 to 1973 on the basis of the responses of the Community and national parliaments to applications for association (Article 238 EC Treaty) and membership (Article 237 EC Treaty) and to a US foreign policy initiative. It challenges the thesis that the European Community was originally uninterested in the political nature of its members as long as they were non-communist and that the Community made a volte face in 1962 in reaction to a request for an association agreement by Franco's Spain. It argues that the Copenhagen political criteria, except minority protection, were firmly established by 1973 after a series of pronouncements and decisions by the European Parliament, national parliaments (1957), which expresses the desire of the founders of the EEC "to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe"; to pool "their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty"; and calls "upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts". However, Article 237 did not establish a link between membership and the preambular reference to liberty.
took great pains to stay closely to the terms of the mandate of the 1955 Messina conference, which led to the creation of the European Economic Community, and were hesitant to go beyond the most basic institutional and legal mechanisms they deemed necessary for the functioning of EURATOM and the EC to avoid a repetition of the fate of the European Defence Community and the European Political Community, which had been rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954. 10 Indeed, the wording of Article 237 was so concise that it did not even mention economic conditions of membership-a good reason not to read too much into the silence in this provision on political conditions.
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Instead, this article reconstructs the evolution of political criteria of membership on the basis of evolving practice in response to a series of concrete cases. It describes the responses of competent organs of the Community and Member States to applications for association and membership under Articles 237 and 238 of the EC Treaty in the late 1950s and 1960s as well as to an external challenge to define the political character of the Community and its members in 1973. This article finds no evidence for a dramatic volte face from functionalism to political conditionality in the early 1960s, and argues that political criteria for membership evolved without evident U-turns from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. In concludes with some observations on the relevance of the early history of political accession conditionality. The article is partly based on sources from the archive of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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| ASSOCIATION AND MEMBERSHIP
Almost all episodes in the evolution of the political accession criteria in the late 1950s and 1960s were not so much about accession (Article 237), but about association (Article 238), or to be more precise, about association with a tentative prospect of membership. It is useful, in preparing the ground for the next sections, to first take a closer look at some aspects of these articles, especially their aims, procedures and mutual relations.
The aim of accession was clear and unequivocal, the aim of association less so. Certainly, an association agreement was more ambitious than a preferential trade agreement but fell short of full membership. But Article 238
was silent on the precise aims and substance of such agreements. It merely stated that an association embodies "reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions and special procedures". Association agreements could thus have many different aims, including the extension of the customs union; the establishment of a free trade area; the harmonization of economic policies; the provision of financial or development assistance to enhance employment and the standard of living; and, indeed, preparing the way for membership. 13 Yet it is important to point out that the letter of the treaty did not envision membership as an inevitable objective of an association agreement; an associate could very well have the status of a privileged outsider of the Community. For this reason, a willingness to establish an association agreement with a country cannot, on the basis of the EC Treaty, be taken to imply a willingness to allow that country to become a member-a point to which we shall return.
According to the EC Treaty, the procedures to arrive at association and membership agreements were different.
Under Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, an association agreement "shall be concluded by the Council, acting unanimously after consulting the Assembly". The Community as a legal person concluded the agreement with the third State. Accession to the European Community, by contrast, required the unanimous vote of the Council, based on an opinion of the Commission, and also ratification by all six national parliaments. In theory, membership agreements were thus more directly the subject of debate in national politics of the six members than association agreements.
In practice, however, the first two association agreements, with Greece and Turkey, were concluded by the Community and Member States jointly, despite the text of Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome. Negotiators found that the agreements had to cover areas where Member States had retained treaty-making power and the Community had no competence. 14 These "mixed agreements" were presented to national parliaments for ratification.
National politics was thus an important factor in determining the fate of association agreements, apart from the fact that the governments of the Six were accountable to their parliaments for their behaviour in the Council. The successful conclusion of association agreements, just like accession agreements, in practice required support in the parliaments of the Six.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, many countries within Europe expressed an interest in association: Greece (1959) , Turkey (1959) , Austria (1961) , Sweden (1961) , Switzerland (1961) , Spain (1962) and Portugal (1962) .
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There were also applications for membership under Article 237 from the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland (all 1961) . In view of this overwhelming interest, a lack of precedent, and the vagueness of the aims and some procedural details of Article 238, the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament and Member States spent a great deal of time on discussing principles of association and membership. 16 In 1959 the Commission attempted to formulate a common position on association at the request of the Council, the so-called First Memorandum. 17 It was followed by a Second Memorandum later that year. 18 The Commission continued to hold meetings on association and wrote an internal report on neutral states in 1962. 19 The Political Committee of the European Parliament, chaired by Willi Birkelbach, submitted a report in late 1961 which was unanimously adopted by the 15 Cohen, above, n. 14, at 521. 16 The brief overview presented here is based on Phinnemore, above, n. 13, at 30-40 and on sources in the Dutch National Archive.
Procedural difficulties regarding association centred around whether the Commission had the competence to conduct negotiations. See T. Oppermann, 'Die Assoziierung Griechenlands mit der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft ' (1962) In the course of these years a few principles emerged on which all European bodies and Member States agreed.
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These included the principle that associates would not be offered the right to take part in the Community's internal decision making; an associate remained an outsider to the Commission, the Council, Parliament and COREPER. 28 As the Commission's First Memorandum expressed this "essential difference" between association and membership, "the associate country retains its full individuality on the political plane". 29 Yet none of the many reports achieved the status of official Community association policy. In fact, the Commission and COREPER gave up on the attempt to formulate a general theory because the differences between interested third countries were too significant and because opinion among Member States and Community organs was too divided on some of the issues. The Community decided on requests for association and membership on a case-by-case basis. It was also cautious: after Greece and Turkey the Community would not conclude any association agreements with other European countries until 1970 with Malta.
One of the unresolved issues in the early 1960s with a direct bearing on the story of this article was the relation between association of European states and accession. The letter of the EC Treaty implied that membership was a possible, but not an inevitable, aim of an association, as was mentioned before. Opinion among Member States and Community organs was divided. One view held that an association agreement with a European state was only possible if the state was willing and able in due course to become a full member. The Italian Memorandum, for instance, argued that association should … only be considered as a temporary stage, that is as a preliminary step towards the initial objective, i.e. full membership. It is in fact conceivable that the economic structure of the State concerned might not be sufficiently advanced to enable it to subscribe to all the obligations attaching to membership, and that it would therefore be advisable to resort provisionally to association as a means of enabling the said State to reach the same economic level as its partners.
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If a European state was unwilling to become a member, the "only alternative would be to confine oneself to a trade agreement". 31 Interestingly, Italy believed that membership was conditional upon meeting political conditions. It therefore argued that political conditionality not only applied to Article 237 but to Article 238 as well; in the case of "an association with a view to, and conditional upon membership, it is important that the State in question should meet the necessary political requirements for membership, both at home and abroad". 32 Italy believed that these "guiding principles" were applied in the case of Greece and Turkey "and should also be followed with regard to association applications made by other European countries". Greece, 1959 Greece, -2009 Greece, ' (2011 constitution was adopted after a referendum, and elections were held again that were free and fair. The new constitution provided for additional checks and balances, including the establishment of a constitutional court, and made the media and the universities independent. Greece also had peaceful elections after the civil war ended in 1949, but its democracy was unstable with new elections being held almost every year in the 1950s.
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On the face of it, Turkey and Greece were democracies, unlike Spain and Portugal. The Greek government had presented the rationale for its inclusion in the European Free Trade Area in 1957 as "the defence of the European and more specifically of the democratic way of life in the whole area" of south-eastern Europe. 45 In this sense, Turkey and Greece were no litmus test of whether the European Community and national parliaments held that prospective members needed to satisfy political conditions. Reality was less convincing. Turkey saw a return to authoritarian politics in the mid-1950s with government control of the media and universities (which were, however, reversed with the new constitution in 1961), restrictions on political meetings during elections, and a pogrom against Greek citizens. 46 Greece had a lack of press freedom, heavy US involvement in politics and the army, a prevalence of clientelism which undermined the functioning of democracy, and the 1961 elections were rigged. 47 Such facts are insufficient, however, to conclude that the Community was agnostic about the political nature of its possible future members.
Such a conclusion would require a test to separate real from (partly) cosmetic democracies which can be used, without anachronism, with respect to candidates as well as then members. With its request for "an association which may in due time be transformed into full integration", Spain aimed at a long-term commitment for stable economic development and, as a result, political stability.
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Spain, like Greece and Turkey, was unable to meet the economic conditions of accession. 60 Moreover, Spain expected less resistance to an application for association than to an application for membership, since the latter required ratification by all six national parliaments where Franco's regime was controversial. 61 As early as December 1958, an inter-ministerial committee, which had been installed by Franco to study the impact of the Treaty of Rome and to advise on the policy to be followed, had concluded that association would be easier to achieve than accession:
Article 237 talks about the incorporation into the Common Market on an equal footing to the signatory states, and it requires their unanimity as well as the subsequent ratification by their parliaments, consequence of a positive response to the Spanish application, in his view, was that it was only a matter of time before a. the presence of a democratically elected parliament, so that the government is founded on the free will of the citizens b. an effective safeguarding of human rights, in particular of individual liberty and freedom of expression, which presupposes the termination of government censorship c. the right to organization in trade unions on a democratic basis and the recognition that employees must be able to defend their fundamental rights, which cannot exclude the right to strike d. recognition of the freedom of assembly and the right to organize in political parties and recognition of the rights of the oppositionFurthermore holds that it is necessary to give special attention to these fundamental starting points with regard to the request of Spain to accede to the E.E.C. Requests the Dutch government to let itself be guided by these considerations in assessing applications for membership of the E.E.C.' (the resolution was drafted by Goedhart from the Labour Party (P.v. to start exploratory talks on resolving difficulties which Spain encountered, as a result of the economic integration of the Six they insisted on explicitly ruling out an association agreement as the outcome of negotiations. The Dutch government even proposed that the Council had to limit the mandate of the Commission, which would initiate and organize those exploratory talks, and formally prohibit it from raising the option of an association agreement. 83 This was unacceptable to France and Germany, which did not want to endorse a formal rejection of an association agreement. In the end, the Six agreed on the formulation that "the Council … authorises the Commission to initiate talks with the Spanish government which aim to examine the economic problems posed by the development of the EEC for Spain and explore appropriate solutions". The Spanish were expected not to mention association in the negotia- to ban extreme left-wing and right-wing parties to defend democracy against authoritarian movements. Indeed, the Six, especially Italy and West Germany, had willingly subjected themselves to the European Court of Human Rights to "lock-85 Thomas's positive argument in support of his thesis-the negative is the absence of references to political conditions in the Treaty of Rome against the background of the Draft EPC Treaty, as mentioned in the introduction-consists of statements in the late 1950s and early 1960s by governments and the Commission in support of association agreements with Spain and Portugal. However, the link between association and membership was controversial, as discussed in paragraph 2 above: support for an association agreement with Spain cannot simply be translated as support for membership. Take the fact that, in 1958, the European Community started discussion on the relation between the Community and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which consisted of 11 members, including Portugal. According to Thomas, the Commission's memorandum on the issue 'recommended that any of the Eleven willing to pursue deeper integration should be offered association or full membership in the EEC in accordance with Articles 238 and 237 of the Treaty of Rome. Spain was not mentioned in any of these documents because it was not yet a member of the OEEC, but the casual inclusion of Portugal, a highly repressive dictatorship formerly allied with Nazi Germany, confirms that the presence or absence of democracy was not an important consideration'. Thomas, 'Beyond Identity', above, n. 4, at 227. But the First Memorandum merely states that 'any European countries already anxious to go further in economic integration and to benefit more rapidly from its machinery are free to bring into play Articles 237 and 238 of the Treaty of Rome'. The Memo then gives a neutral explanation of the differences between association and membership. There are no country-specific recommendations on which option would be possible or preferred. See First Memorandum, above, n. 17, paras 85-87. Moreover, the First General Report on the Activities of the Community (1 January 1958 to 17 September 1958), 17 September 1958, 120-122, para. 159 explicitly states that the Community should form association agreements under Article 238 with the 11 OEEC countries. This was not about membership.
86 Thomas, 'Beyond Identity', above, n. 4, at 233. 87 Moreover, given the fact that national parliaments were required for accession treaties and, according to emerging practice, for association agreements as well, the idea of a purely functionalist beginning of the Community presupposes that all national parliaments were agnostic with respect to political conditions of membership before the Spanish Question. In view of the unanimous support for a resolution on political conditions of membership by the Dutch parliament in 1962, to take just one example, this is unlikelywhat evidence is there for a seismic shift in all six member states?
88 I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer. in" their liberal democracies and prevent backsliding. 92 Against this background it is unlikely that the Six would be prepared to give up part of their sovereignty to the partly supranational scheme of the European Community and then allow the two remaining fascist dictatorships to take part in the running of the enterprise.
Another reason lies in the Treaty of Rome itself. Article 138(1) states that the Parliamentary Assembly's members "shall be designated by the respective Parliaments from among their members" and Article 138(3) adds, as an ambition to be realized in the future, that the "Assembly shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States". Article 138(1) did not specify which procedure Member
States needed to follow in electing members of the Assembly, but it was generally understood that both government parties and the opposition were represented in the Assembly. 93 A uniform system of direct elections of representatives of the Assembly, which was the objective of Article 138(3), still needed to be designed, but it was clear that such elections needed to be free, for all citizens and by secret ballot. 94 It is hard to imagine how the Six, given these commitments to the present and future of the European Parliament, could allow countries as members which did not subscribe to the principle of free and fair elections and to political representation of the opposition.
In short, there are good reasons to believe the official story in Article 21(1) TEU as far as political membership conditions are concerned: the principles of democracy, human rights and rule of law appear to have "inspired" the EU's "own creation, development and enlargement".
| GREECE REVISITED
On 21 April 1967, a group of officers, mostly colonels, committed a coup d'état under the pretence of preventing a communist plot. For the next seven years Greece was ruled by a military dictatorship. 95 Thousands of political opponents were put under house arrest or deported to prison islands. Many of those imprisoned were not brought before a competent legal authority; others were sentenced by courts martial for their political opinions. Political parties and political activities were prohibited. Elections were cancelled. Universities were put under direct police control, including regular auditing of lectures. Censorship was applied. Torture was widespread. The right to assembly was abolished. The junta justified many of these measures by "a public emergency threatening the life of the nation".
The European Commission of Human Rights, which examined "The Greek Case" following applications by the governments of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands, found no compelling evidence that the state of emergency was called for. It also concluded that the junta violated provisions on the rights to liberty and security, free speech, fair trial, privacy and a family life and on the prohibition of punishment without law under the European Convention on Human Rights. 96 Greece's descent into authoritarianism was painful for the European Community; Greece had obtained the very type of treaty that Spain had requested in 1962 but was denied on account of its political system. The terms of the Athens Agreement went far beyond the preferential trade agreement which Madrid would conclude in 1970. The question was obvious: could the Athens Agreement continue to be upheld now that Greece was no longer a democracy but a military dictatorship? For the first time the European Community was faced with the question of how to deal with democratic backsliding, albeit of an associate who had been offered a prospect of membership, not of a member. Needless to say, neither the Treaty of Rome nor the Athens Treaty provided for this eventuality.
The European Parliament immediately took the initiative. 97 Through a series of oral and written questions and a resolution, MPs pressured the Commission and the Council to take position on the consequences of the coup d'état for the Athens Treaty. On 2 May Mr Van der Goes van Naters asked whether the Commission agreed that "the norms, by which European countries are justifiably measured for association with a view to membership, no longer apply to the current regime in Greece" and whether "it is consequently prepared to suspend the execution of the current agreement with Greece". 98 On 9 May Mr Faller asked both the Commission and the Council whether "the normal execution of the Association Agreement can be guaranteed after the military coup d'état". 99 On 11 May the European Parliament adopted a lengthy resolution which stated, among other things, that "the association agreement between Greece and the European Community, which includes the prospect of membership, can only be executed … if the democratic structures, political freedoms and the freedom of trade associations are restored" and that "the absence of elected institutions in Greece … makes it impossible for the Mixed Parliamentary Commission, which is indispensable for the proper execution of the Treaty of Athens, to carry out its tasks". 100 On 14 July Mr Seifriz asked the Commission to explain "which articles in the Association Agreement … are currently applied and executed" and which articles are not.
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The Commission's initial response was cautious, but in the summer and autumn it carved out a clear position. On 23
June the Commission declared that the Community "cannot remain indifferent with respect to the constitutional system of a country which, like Greece, aims to become member of the European Community" and that "the events which have occurred since 21 April give rise to serious concerns which threaten the further development of the association". 102 On 22 September the Commission clarified that "articles in the AthensTreaty … which entail clearly defined legal obligations continue to be applied, particularly where these concern tariffs and trade". It added that "nothing has been done to implement … articles which do not specify precise obligations but furnish a framework for the future development of the Association, in particular provisions for harmonisation of the agricultural policies of the Communities and , 1967-74' (1977-78) 16(2) Journal of Common Market Studies, 114-131; S. Verney, 'Greece and the European Community', above, n. 36.
98 Publikatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen, Vol. 10, no. 169, 26 July 1967 , 169/7-9 (Written question no. 53, 2 May 1967 .
99 Publikatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen, Vol. 10, no. 169, 26 July 1967 , 169/9-10 (Written question no. 59, 9 May 1967 .
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Publikatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen, Vol. 10, No. 103, 2 June 1967 , 2058 (Resolution with respect to the association between the E.E.C. and Greece, 11 May 1967) .
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Publikatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen, Vol. 10, no. 243, 7 October 1967 , 243/3 (Written question no. 53, 14 July 1967 .
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Publikatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen, Vol. 10, no. 169, 26 July 1967 , 169/8 (Reply to written question Mr Van der Goes van Naters, 23 June 1967 .
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Publikatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen, Vol. 10, no. 243, 7 October 1967 , 243/3 (Reply to written question Mr Seifriz, 22 September 1967 .
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Publikatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen, Vol. 10, no. 243, 7 October 1967 , 243/3 (Reply to written question Mr Seifriz, 22 September 1967 For the next six years, the Commission would continue to refer to these statements as its final and non-negotiable position until democracy in Greece was restored. 106 After the return to democracy in 1974, the Greek government applied for full membership of the European Community. It is Opinion on the Greek application, issued in 1976, the Commission recalled that the Community had "frozen" the Athens Agreement from 1967 to 1974 because of the dictatorship. 107 This metaphor of a freeze, which was widely used at the time, made the Communities' response sound robust; it was the firmest reaction short of the abrogation of the Treaty. Yet the metaphor was deceptive. 108 True, financial aid was terminated. The Commission reduced the application of the treaty to specific legal obligations. But these specific legal obligations were quite significant. The tariff reductions, for example, proceeded as scheduled. Moreover, the distinction between specific legal obligations and other provisions was easy to make in theory but somewhat less so in practice. For example, the progressive introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy made elaborate negotiations with Greece on agricultural policy harmonization inevitable. In the early 1970s the Commission also had to enter into negotiations with the junta to extend the Athens Agreement to the three new members, Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark. It thus seems more accurate to characterize the relation between Greece and the European Community as a "limited association" than as a freeze. Opinion on the third application for membership from these countries. The Commission chose these Opinions to formulate its own take on the principles that had been beneath the Community's responses to the Spanish, Portuguese and Greek cases. The Commission argued that applications for membership should be examined in the "spirit" of the Treaty of Rome's preambular invitation to European countries which share the ideal of liberty. The Commission stated that, from this "political angle", or "on the plane of principles", it was clear that membership was only open to democratic states. 113 The Commission continued that "the Community has always considered that full membership was the arrangement that accorded best with the objectives of the Treaties" for European "countries which are sufficiently developed economically and possess institutions and regimes comparable with those of the founder States". 114 The
Commission noted that exceptions must be made for southern European states which are not ready to assume the economic obligations of membership. Links between such states and the Community should normally take the form of a preferential trade agreement. The Commission did not rule out that southern European states could also conclude an association agreement "proper" or "in the strict sense", but added that association, like membership, was conditional on meeting the political condition of a democratic form of government.
As regards Europe, the Community has always believed that membership was the solution most in conformity with the aims of the Treaties for those democratic countries which have attained a sufficient degree of economic development. On the other hand, the southern European countries, whose level of development precludes immediate membership, should be able to establish with the enlarged Community preferential relations so conceived that their development would benefit. However, it should be possible for these relations to take the form of an association in the strict sense only where the countries concerned have free institutions; others could be offered agreements in a number of stages, so that the Community could take account of their subsequent evolution.
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In short, the Commission held that both membership and association of European states were subject to political conditions, just like the Italian Memorandum had argued in 1964. It is tempting to view this Declaration through the lens of the Spanish and Greek cases. In fact, the Declaration was not at all the apotheosis of the recent history of accession and association; it was the spontaneous reaction to a US 121 The Nixon administration was dismayed with this "Proposal on
Relations with the US", both because it had not been consulted and because the proposal hardly attempted to resolve the issues which the Year of Europe was meant to address. On 29 September, the Nixon administration proposed a lengthy "Modified Draft of a US-Common Market Statement", which seriously amended the European statement.
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These amendments were in turn rejected by the French. An intense round of discussions between the US and EC governments followed, but to no avail. On 13-14 December the EC just issued its Declaration on European Identity, which defined "the unity of the nine member countries of the Community" (part 1), "the European Identity in relation to the world" (part 2) and "the dynamic nature of the construction of a United Europe" (part 3).
The Year of Europe did not bring about a new blueprint for US-EC relations, but it did have the unintended consequence of a joint statement by the Council on political conditions of membership: "The Nine wish to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected … they are determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice-which is the ultimate goal of economic progress-and of respect for human rights. the European Council had decided that "the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union" and that "accession will take place as soon as … the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities". The significance of the Copenhagen European Council lies not so much in the political criteria-though minority protection was new-but in the fact that satisfaction of these criteria became an aim of the pre-accession strategy, a policy with a transformative aim, which was announced in Copenhagen and formally launched by the Essen European Council in 1994. The pre-accession strategy involved formulating reform targets, monitoring whether these targets were met, and using conditionality to enforce compliance, and all of this required the Commission to clarify the meaning of the political accession criteria. For the pre-accession strategy, see C.A.P. Hillion, 'EU Enlargement', in P. Craig and G. in Les Verts, many core ingredients of this value were already figuring in judgments from Algera in 1957 onwards, and were derived from constitutional traditions common to the Member States.
129 Indeed, the rule of law was built into Article 164 of the EC Treaty, which provided that the Court of Justice shall ensure observance of law and justice in the interpretation and application of thisTreaty. 130 The protection of fundamental rights became a self-evident characteristic of the constitutional systems of Member States by the late 1960s, if not before.
